Alan Poore story of his Grand Father 2nd Engineer John Poore

Story by Allen Poore “My Grandfather John Poore 2nd Engineer William Pierce Frye”

This is something I wrote in 2007. In any civilized circle it would be seen as raw, ugly and unorganized to which I plead guilty. I suppose it just poured out of me, because I've carried it with me since I was a small kid growing up on a farm in Southern Maine. I will say that it is the result of many years of on again, off again research.

What I do hope is that it will provoke discussion over this oft overlooked aspect of the war. There was no VE or VJ Day without the Merchant Marine and their heroic sacrifice. With that said....on to my ugly writing style. Please bare with me: I'm not a writer, I don't know where it's going, nor what it will include. It will, I imagine, resemble more of a rough sea complete with its ups and downs. It's a story told as my memory and research dictates it, nothing more.

Most importantly, I feel it's my grandfather's legacy-----his truth, and it is a collection of things beginning with my earliest handed down memories of him which I have collected and stored, over years in my mind......stories that were given me as a child whose lore changed later in life, into the reality of how it really turned out to be.

This whole journey, for me, has been to simply understand the grandfather I was robbed of knowing.
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John Poore was born in Sommerville, Massachusetts, Nov. 29, 1891. He was one of 10 children, placed in an orphanage as a boy because my great grandmother could not care for them all. His father ran off with another woman leaving her destitute and to fend for herself. She did the best that she could at that time. I don't know if he ever remained in contact with his brothers and sisters as he got older, somewhere along the way they began to be separated and to this day I suppose I have family between here and Labrador.

One thing that I do know about my grandfather is that even as a boy he demonstrated real mechanical aptitude, which would put him in good stead later on in life. He would need it because he would never go beyond a grade school education. I don't know much about his formative years, nor what comprised his early life, but he must have possessed a penchant for ships and the sea. He was serving on tugs and the like prior to WWI. In 1912, he enlists and serves in the U.S. Navy.

I remember my dad telling me that he had opined that he found his naval experience, "like being in hell with your back broke". I have no idea what type of ship he served upon, but I do have a photo of him standing with a friend in uniform in front of a turret of what looked like three 6" guns. Apparently he never lost his love of the sea, because he seemed to seek berth after berth upon it. At some time during this period, he also met my grandmother, I know not where or when.

The record indicates, according to my mother, that they were married in Manhattan on May 20, 1921. My grandmother hated the city and wanted to move back to the outskirts of Worcester, Massachusetts, which they finally did. It would prove to hamper his ability to earn the above average wages he was making on tugs and barges. One thing that I also notice about my grandfather was that he seemed to suffer from a sense of wanderlust----or perhaps it was just that he was always looking for a better wage.

In a span of 10 years, from 1910-1921, including his stint in the Navy, he held 13 different jobs, all but one on a ship or tug, serving as everything from a coal passer and fireman, to oiler, assistant engineer to finally Chief Engineer. As someone who was very handy mechanically, he experienced wages considered above average for its day varying from $9/wk. in 1910 to a decade later with the astronomical wage of $186/mo. Yet, the day that they packed up and left New York harbor, their fortune turned and he was forced to look for odd jobs to pay the bills. By that time, my Aunt had been born, to be followed by my father and his brother.

The family was growing. My grandfather loved music......and more importantly, he loved dancing. My mother mentioned that he was known for always bringing a separate pair of dancing shoes. Later on when my dad was a small boy, they were living upstairs over what had once been a tavern that dated back to the Revolutionary War. Downstairs they frequently hosted dances on Saturday evenings. My grandfather would hire a local band, and out of his pocket, shell out his precious savings for several cases of coke which they would sell to the thirsty crowd.

The tavern being situated on a muddy lane, it was very easy to get the jalopies of the day mired in the ruts and it was up to my father and his younger brother to keep the draft horses hitched in order to pull people out. And, so life went.

In talks with my dad before he passed away, he remembered idyllic days as a boy. There were the dances.....ice skating on the pond nearby with all the local kids, and working on area farms. In one of my father's whimsical moments he said that he could remember coming home from working in summer and laying on his stomach on the floor, resting his cheek on the cool stone of the hearth. Such was life I in simpler days. It's strange what the mind remembers.

I can remember things going back to pre-school, but I couldn't tell you what I ate two days ago. I remember the day that I found out that my grandfather had been killed in the war. I was going to school half-days. On this particular day, I was seated at the kitchen table at our farmhouse. My mother was stirring something in a saucepan on the wood stove with her back to me when out of the blue I remember thinking about my grandparents.

I knew my mothers side very well. Both were still alive and active in our lives. We would travel to see them on holidays, or they would come up to summer at our farm for long periods of time. Yet, on this day my thought had turned to my other grandparents. I had known my other grandmother somewhat.

Whenever we traveled to stay with my mothers folks we would always take a ride over to see my father's mom, who was now living in a top floor apt. on a small rural farm outside of Worcester. I would never come to know her as well as my other grandparents and my memories of her are grainy. On this day however, as my mum stood there stirring the saucepan, I remember blurting out a question to her about my grandfather and how come I never saw him.

I remember my mother sort of glancing over her shoulder and then she paused and said that well, he had died. And, I asked how. She whacked the spoon on the side of the pan and kind of turned around and said that he had been killed. I asked who had killed him to which she replied that it was a long time ago (which in reality it wasn't), but that it was war. You could have hit me with a bat and I wouldn't have blinked.

I couldn't believe it. Some one had intentionally killed my grandfather. In asking her who it was, she replied that it was the Germans and that it had happened on the ocean-------which wasn't resonating with me at all. I thought war was about army men. Looking back at it now, I know it upset my mum to share this revelation because she knew it had upset me, but that phrase "it was war", always stuck with me.My father had never spoken of his dad to me, but every year during the last of March, his brother & sister would come up from Massachusetts and we'd all drive down to the ocean. My dad would bring with him, a wreath that he'd had made up at a florist, and he would climb out over the rocks as far as he could and throw the wreath out on to the ocean. He would stand there a few minutes, as did we all, and then he would make his way back and we would hop in the car and make the trip back home.

I remember that on occasion my fathers pant legs would sometimes get soaked.One day he came to me and gave me the memorial frame that all the Gold Star families had received from the Mystic Steamship Company, whom the ship had been registered to. It was a frame and in the middle of it was a miniature life saving ring with a photo of my grandfather in the center of it. On the outside of the ring was painted the words, "S.S. William P. Frye." Rope lined the interior of the frame and below his picture were the Merchant Marine medals he had been awarded.

I hung it up in my room over my bed and draped it with two small American flags on sticks. Save for what my dad shared on occasion, or family folklore dictated surrounding the sinking of the Frye, this was all I knew until I was much older. On the day that I found that I could afford to buy a personal computer, I also found that it would become the tool that I used to begin destroying the myths.

The Hunt begins:

The first thing I did was to begin researching the ship itself. I found out that the William P. Frye had been built by the New England Shipbuilding Company in So. Portland, Maine. It was built in February of 1943; the Length over All (LOA) was 441 feet x 47 x37. I should note here as well before America retrofitted and began pumping out ships on a weekly basis that at the outset of war, the War Shipping Administration (WSA), had placed under its control, all merchant vessels, refitting them with armament, armor, and counter-measure equipment such as degaussing. Degaussing was simply the act of "demagnetizing" a ship so that it would not attract magnetic mines. This was first accomplished by laying electromagnetic coils into the ships, which was quite expensive.

A cheaper method was found by the Navy called "wiping". They simply dragged a large electrical cable along the side of the ship with approx. 2000 amps flowing through it, which induced the proper field into the ship in the form of a slight bias. The WSA assumed responsibility for the ships, should they be damaged or sunk, and contracted with qualified shipping companies to operate them. Cargo assignment and routing was provided by the U.S. Navy.The merchant ships also began carrying a Navy Armed Guard contingent of one officer and about twenty men to operate and maintain the guns, although they were often short of that complement. The gun crews were filled out with civilian crew members, sometimes including ship's officers.Initial armament was by guns drawn from the stored weapons from World War I.

Emphasis was on the stern weapon, often a 4 inch 50 caliber gun, supplemented with a lighter caliber gun in the bow and machine guns of .30 and .50 caliber distributed about the ship, such as on the flying bridge. When more suitable weapons became available as weapon production ramped up, these lighter weapons were replaced with heavier and more modern equipment.The Liberty Ship was the most numerous ship design in sea service, with over 2,700 built during World War II. It can serve as the prime example of the armed merchant ship and its weapons.Armament was typically one 5 inch 38 caliber gun on the stern; one 3 inch 50 caliber gun in the point of the bow; a 20 mm Oerlikon machine gun on each of the four corners of the flying bridge (the open top deck of the midship house); and two 20 mm Oerlikon guns, one on the end of each wing of the after steering station atop the poop house. All of the guns were mounted in circular gun tubs about waist high protected with plastic armor.

This gave a total armament of one 5 inch, one 3 inch and six 20 mm weapons.Plastic armor was composed of a bituminous (blacktop) matrix impregnated with stones. It was invented by the British to replace expensive and scarce steel armor. Plastic armor was also used to protect the bridge and radio room of merchant ships. Troop Transport Liberties, which were fitted out to carry 500 troops plus their combat equipment, retained the 5 inch 38 caliber gun on the stern and the 3 inch 50 caliber gun on the bow.

The 20 mm Oerlikon guns at the after steering station were replaced by two 3 inch 50 caliber guns. Two 20 mm Oerlikon guns were added on the foredeck and two more on the afterdeck, all in raised gun tubs and intended to supplement the four 20 mm guns on the flying bridge. This provided a total armament of one 5 inch, three 3 inch, and eight 20 mm guns. There was no fire control equipment; engagement was over open sights under the direction of the Armed Guard Officer whose action station was on the bridge.

A merchant ship is required to post a notice called the “Station Bill” that lists each crewman’s position and his station while on watch, and his station and duty during an emergency; such as, “Third Mate, Watch Station - Bridge, Emergency Station - Bridge, assist Captain.” In wartime, gun crew stations were also listed and assigned to civilian crew members. Volunteers for service in the Merchant Marine were trained by the U.S. Maritime Service under the War Shipping Administration, a quasi-military organization modeled after the training organization of the U.S. Coast Guard.

In basic training – boot camp – these recruits were given brief training to teach them how to serve in the gun crew at all positions except gun captain, and the gun aiming positions for azimuth and elevation. In advanced training, such as that for Radio Officers, lessons in aiming the weapon were added. On shipboard, gun crew assignments were generally as ammunition passers and loaders. They were also competent to assume the duties of disabled Navy gun crewmen, and to fill out shortages in the other positions of the Armed Guard gun crews.These ships’s armament was meant to be defensive in nature. The standing orders for a merchant ship in combat with a surface ship or surfaced submarine were to turn away, put the attacker on the stern and run (or, when feasible when in contact with a surfaced submarine, to ram him.) Thus, the heaviest armament was on the stern with the tactical intention of discouraging pursuit."

1942 Onward

By July 1942 the days of easy pickings for the U-boats along the Eastern Seaboard of America were over. It was time for Admiral Donitz to switch his efforts back to his old hunting grounds in the mid-Atlantic. He had ample grounds for optimism. In May 1942 German experts had produced a study which concluded that if the U-boats were able to sink a monthly average of 700,000 tons of Allied merchant ships for the rest of the year, Britain, despite all the efforts of shipbuilding yards on both sides of the Atlantic, would be doomed.Though this was more than twice the average monthly sinking's for 1941, Admiral Donitz felt confident of success. At the end of 1941, his U-boat fleet had totaled 236 vessels, which had been sinking 13 Allied merchant ships for every one of their own number lost. They had reduced the total available British merchant fleet by 3 million tons compared with the start of the war. And now Admiral Donitz was returning to the Atlantic convoy routes in a stronger position.

He had a total U-boat strength of 331, of which 141 were operational and an average of 50 constantly on patrol. U-boat HQ at Chateau Kernival in Brittany had become expert in the close orchestration of the increasingly effective "wolf-pack" tactics.Even more significantly and often overlooked in favor of the better-known Allied successes in breaking the Enigma codes, the German cryptologists at "B-Dienst" had pierced the Royal Navy codes, giving details of the assembly points and sailing times of convoys, often giving U-boat HQ between 10 and 20 hours advance warning of enemy intentions.

Just as valuable was German success which between February 1942 and June 1943 frequently enabled them to read the daily British Admiralty estimate of U-boat dispositions, though like the Allies, the Germans had to forgo using much information to avoid the enemy suspecting their success.Despite the steadily increasing numbers of escort vessels becoming available for the convoys, increased air support, and technological advances in anti-submarine warfare, the results of the U-boat war in the second half of 1942 seemed to justify Donitz's hopes. During the last few months of the year, aided by the diversion of many Allied escorts to support the "Torch" landings in North Africa, the U-boats were sinking a monthly average of 650,000 tons. If the vessels sunk by aircraft, mines and such few surface raiders as were still at large were added to this total, Germany seemed on the verge of achieving the sinking rate demanded by her experts.Unfortunately for Admiral Donitz's hopes, his planners had seriously underestimated Allied, particularly American, construction capacity.

During 1943 US shipyards would produce 20 million tons of merchant shipping, ample to replace a total Allied loss during the previous year of about 7 ½ million tons, overestimated by the Germans as twice as much. Though there had been many apparently striking U-boat successes, such as the attack in August on convoy SC94, which had lost 26 ships, and the November assault on SC107, which sank 15 ships, these were deceptive. In fact, therefore, though not fully appreciated by either side, or indeed by many modern historians, at the end of the year the U-boats were no closer to decisive victory. Furthermore, the steadily increasing effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine measures was hinted at by the less favorable, for the Germans, sinking ratio, now running at 10 merchant ships for every U-boat lost.

The Decisive Months:

It was apparent to both sides that the first half of 1943 would be decisive. Donitz began the year believing that the rate of sinking’s being achieved by his crews was slightly outpacing the rate of Allied shipbuilding. His U-boat fleet had now increased to 400 vessels, of which 200 were operational, and an average of 100 at sea -10 more than the total which, at the start of the war, Admiral Donitz had argued would have been sufficient to bring decisive victory, although his estimates then had not allowed for US involvement.Yet Allied effectiveness was also increasing. There were now over 500 escort vessels available, sufficient not only to provide stronger close protection for convoys, but also to allow the formation of "support" or hunter-killer groups, to reinforce convoys under attack.

Equally significant were the on-going advances in anti-submarine warfare being made by the Allies. During the autumn of 1942 the increasingly effective air operations against U-boats crossing the Bay of Biscay in transit to and from their French bases received the welcome assistance of airborne radar. For a time in the autumn of 1942 the U-boats were given some protection against this threat by a radar detection device, but in February 1943 the Allies introduced a new short-wave radar which proved undetectable until the closing stages of the war.

Although it is unclear whether Admiral Donitz had fully grasped the fact, by the beginning of 1943 there were unmistakable signs that, if it had ever really existed, the window of opportunity for a decisive German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was closing rapidly. The first four months of the year saw the rapid introduction by the Allies of a whole range of improved anti-submarine equipment and techniques. As well as improved aircraft-mounted radar, escort carriers were beginning to prove their worth and surface escorts were being equipped with radar, high frequency direction finders and improved anti-submarine weapons such as the "hedgehog" depth charge thrower.

Not only were escorts and aircraft proving more effective, there were also more of them. Between February and May the number of long-range "Liberator" anti-submarine aircraft available rose from ten to over sixty. Although the vast majority of US Navy escort vessels had been diverted by the needs of the Pacific War, leaving the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to perform about 96% of escort duties in the North Atlantic, increasing the size of convoys had made it possible to raise the average number of escorts from six to nine, without increasing the vulnerability of the convoy.

Sufficient escorts had also been released to allow the formation of five British convoy-support groups, the best known being that operating out of Liverpool under Captain J. F. "Johnny" Walker. They were later reinforced by a US group. Each group consisted of between five and seven destroyers and frigates, and three also had an escort carrier. Their role was to accompany convoys through the mid-Atlantic air gap., where they were most vulnerable to attack, whilst the presence of an escort carrier helped provide air support for the entire crossing.Of equal, though again often underrated significance, was the success by now consistently being achieved by the Allied radio direction finders.

Between July 1942 and May 1943 they managed to divert 105 out of a total of 174 North Atlantic convoys away from wolf-pack ambushes, and enabled another 23 partially to avoid such traps. Only 16 ran into large U-boat concentrations, and it was these which suffered the bulk of losses.Despite all these favorable portents for the Allies, the first three months of 1943 saw continued notable U-boat successes. They were aided in part by wintry conditions in the North Atlantic, which made Allied detection less effective, and also by the introduction of the new U-boat Enigma cipher known to Bletchley Park as "Shark", which remained unbroken until the end of March.In February convoy ON 16 lost 14 ships, with the overall merchant ship/U-boat kill ratio for the month standing at 7:1, a decline from the German high point of the previous year, but still offering U-boat Command grounds for hope.The particularly foul weather of March, with convoys and their escorts straggling through gales, blizzards and hail, saw some of the fiercest battles of the war. The beginning of the month saw roughly 50 U-boats at sea. Between 7-10 March, convoy SC 121 lost six ships, with 199 men of their crews, experienced seamen who could be less easily spared than their ships.

The next two convoys, SC 122 and HX 229, were even more savagely mauled by 44 U-boats from wolf packs Sturmer, Dranger and Raubgraf - the greatest U-boat concentration achieved in the entire war. A total of 22 ships of 146,000 tons were lost in March from 8-18.Into to all of this, the 40 ships of convoy HX-230, which included the newly minted S.S. William P. Frye commanded by Master Meinhard Scherf? She departed New York to Liverpool, England via Halifax Nova Scotia. She would be carrying a full load of general cargo including, 7,500 tons of military stores, 750 tons of explosives and wheat in Hold #1, and 5 LCT's (landing craft) lashed to her decks. It's crew consisted of 40 Merchant Marines and 24 Naval Armed Guard.

Convoy HX-230 left New York harbor for the safety of Halifax, Nova Scotia, where it would lie at anchor before getting underway on it's most dangerous leg of the journey. The SS William P. Frye was scarcely a month off the skidway and subsequent shake down cruise before joining the fleet.

Waiting for them were Admiral Doenitz masterful u-boats, strung across the well trodden travel lanes. Wherever ships or convoys pierced the line, the radio signal would go out, and the wolf pack would descend upon it's prey in attack groups. The strategy was simple. There were those u-boats who trailed, while the others sped ahead to lie in wait for the opportunity to fire off a spread of torpedoes, or in cases of larger groups they would attempt encirclement.In early March, the ON convoys (Liverpool to New York) were taking a beating at the hands of the packs, losing twenty in those operations.

The wolf packs could contain anywhere from 15 u-boats on up and when combined into large groups, as many as 30 or more. Then there were the names: Neptun & Burggraf, Waldfang, Ostmark, Neuland, Westmark, and Raubgraf, Seewulf, and Seeteufel to name a few.It was a dangerous game of cat and mouse....u-boats hunting and sinking their prey while subject to the convoy escorts which spewed out it's dangerous array of depth charges, and of late, a newer and more effective threat in the form of long range reconnaissance & escort aircraft like the new Sunderland, capable of dropping depth charges from above. An interesting sound byte can be gathered from a brief example of one such action involving HX-228 and u-boat sub groups Raubgraf and Neuland:Neuland - HX 228.

HX 228 had passed safely to the south of Raubgraf when she sailed into the Neuland area, Hunger (U-336), which had been ordered on the 7th to join the southeast end of Neuland, sighted the convoy at 1335/10 in 50°27'N - 31°15'W. Neuland was of course immediately ordered to operate at maximum speed. On 13 March, when the operation was discontinued, the score stood at four to two, the U-boats having sunk four ships, one of which was HMS Harvester. Harvester sank U-444 (Langfeld) before she was sent down by U-432 (Eckhardt), which in turn was sunk by FFS Aconit.Accounts of mid-March successes & failures.

The HyperWar offers one of the best accounts of the malestrom that convoy HX-230 and the SS William P. Frye was sailing into. Though lengthy, it sets the tone far better than I could ever hope to."Group Neuland's contact on HX 228 is a good example of radio intelligence difficulties at this time - the Germans having introduced a stiff cipher change on 1 March. On the basis of past U-boat behavior as seen in traffic read, a message of 27 February ordering 8 fresh U-boats to head for 56°N - 27°W had been interpreted to mean that a new group was forming in this area.1 This information was on hand by 2 March and was incorporated in a memorandum of that date to COMINCH with the statement that the new group would probably form by 5 March from approximately 56°N - 29°W to 53°N - 28°W.

By 6 March it was known from traffic read that many additional fresh submarines had been given heading points in the same area and it was assumed that the line was being extended. The general arrangement was clear: a long westerly sweep group forming in mid-Atlantic to support Waldfang-Burggraf, whose composition and general location off Newfoundland were known. Actually Neuland U-boats with a total then of 17 members were ordered on 3 March to form by noon of the 7th from 54°45'N - 27°15'W to 51°N - 23°45'W. As further additions arrived the line was extended southward to 49° 45'N as well as northward. Contact on SC 121 by Hopmann had drawn off the northern half of the group before the U-boats could get in line.

It was certainly reasonable to assume, as was done, that some of the U-boats, the northerly ones, in the mid-Atlantic concentration would close SC 121 and that the southern members would hold their line and carry out a westerly sweep. This split had taken place before, but it was not possible to fix the exact lines. Past experience had shown, however, that at this time no route north of 50°N could be regarded as safe unless every U-boat could be accounted for day by day and unless every patrol line was known to the last second of position and knot of sweeping speed. With the U-boat group pattern that was made clear in February, Command could cover every lane north of 50°N with his staggered sweeps. Even so he got contacts he had not counted on, for there was no way on either side of allowing for the element of chance.

As it was, the convoy HX 228 almost cleared the Neuland concentration, and the escorts gave the U-boats some rough treatment."Raubgraf-Stürmer-Dränger, convoys HX 229 and SC 122 surrounded.The attack on HX 229 - SC 122 marks the high point of March convoy operations - in terms of number of U-boats, number of ship's sunk, and last but not least, in terms of German exploitation of their intelligence on convoys. The operation is discussed from the point of view of German intelligence in Volume III, Chapter IV, where the probable compromise of an early HX 229 diversion dispatch is examined.U-boat group arrangement prior to contact.Eleven Neuland U-boats turned back westward from their pursuit of HX 228 with orders to take up a reconnaissance line from 53°45'N - 37°55'W to 50°33'N - 36°15'W as group Dränger.

At the same time U-boats to the north (approximately 25) including many from port, were forming group Strumer just west of 30°W and running from about 60°N down to the latitude of Dränger. With Raubgraf off Newfoundland the pattern was complete. Disappointed of HX 228, Raubgraf had turned its attention to ON 170 during the pause while the U-boats waited for the next eastbound convoy. Expected on 10 March, ON 170 had been delayed by bad weather and was not sighted until the 13th, when Bertelsmann (U-603) reported the convoy in 50°03'N - 44°25'W. The operation failed, contact not being maintained for anyone period long enough to permit successful attack. As the U-boats moved southwest looking for ON 170 they were informed of their next assignment: to form on the 15th across the route of a northeast bound convoy, HX 229. The timing and the location of the line were excellent.Radio intelligence comment.By March 13, Raubgrafs intentions against ON 170 were known from traffic.

That the U-boats were moving southwest could be seen from D/F's as they attempted to operate. Hence the convoy diversion of 13 March was sound. The exact location of Stürmer and Dränger U-boats were not known but it was appreciated, again from headings of outbound U-boats and past behavior that a powerful concentration was building up in the mid-Atlantic north of 50° N. What no one was prepared for at the moment was the sudden intrusion of German convoy intelligence which put Raubgraf at high speed on an interception course.Contact established after extensive maneuvers.At 1847A/14, before Raubgraf could take up the line ordered for the 15th, they were sent east southeast at high speed.

The U-boats actually stopped short of intercepting HX 229 and were a little too far behind SC 122. They knew the convoy was there, but it was not until Feiler (U-653) ran into the convoy as he headed for a refueler off to the southeast that U-boats began to move with a final degree of assurance. Before Feiler found HX 229, a new Raubgraf line of nine U-boats was set up, to be in position by 1200/15 from 51° 15'N - 42°05'W to 49°27'N - 40°55'W "for an eastbound convoy to which further groups can later also be detailed." (1920/14) The line was shifted eastward slightly and, in order to make the search as comprehensive as possible, even damaged submarines were by every means possible to arrive in positions. "The convoy must be found." (0443/15) At noon the line was moved southward, patrolling on a southeast course, reversing to northeast at 1000/16 if no contact was made. As a result of Walkerling's (U-91) report of a destroyer and "suspected convoy" in 49°33'N- 40°35'W, three other U-boats were detailed to search with him, the remainder of the group moving eastward to form a new patrol line the following day from 51°15'N - 38°55'W to 49°21'N - 37°45'W.

The first actual contact was that made in 49°27'N - 37°25'W by Feiler (U-653), who was directed to shadow until other Raubgraf U-boats could close in for the attack.U-boats close from all directions.An additional three U-boats were assigned to the convoy upon completion of refueling and the eleven U-boats which comprised the southern half of Stürmer were ordered to operate immediately, while the northern part of the group proceeded on a southeasterly course to circumvent any possible diversion. The 20 U-boats already operating searched for seven hours and found only an occasional steamer until Zurmtihlen (U-601) located the whole convoy again at 1506/16. However, he was immediately driven off by an escort. With so many U-boats in the vicinity of the convoy it was inevitable that contact should be resumed at once, this time by Kapitzky (U-605) who sent beacon signals until midnight. Raubgraf was reminded that:"a good fix in that area is of the greatest importance because of the highly irregular currents at the junction of the Gulf Stream and the Labrador current.

For that reason always report a new fix." (1628/16 March 1943)The accuracy of Kapitzky's sighting reports and his beacon signals succeeded in homing about a dozen U-boats on HX 229 for the critical first night attack. Although four escort vessels had held the attackers at bay from the first sightings until darkness set in, they were hopelessly outnumbered thereafter; the wide convoy formation described by Feiler demanded an omnipresent escort, which was patently impossible.U-boats run out of torpedoes. "The beginning was first class."Bertelsmann (U-603) claimed to have made the first attack and when Walkerling (U-91) reported the sinking of two freighters he also reported that the convoy's defenses were apparently weak.

After 0400/17 attack and success reports followed hard upon one another with Manseck (U-758) claiming four, Strelow (U-435) a probable three, and Zurmühlen (U-600) "left a 5,000 tonner burning briskly and sinking" (0630/17) after which he retired temporarily in order to send beacon signals. At 0905/17 Walkerling (U-91) reported from 50°51'N - 34°25'W "3 hits on 2 damaged ships. Still 3 large damaged ships remaining. Request (another) sub. Have no torpedoes left." Bertelsmann (U-603) was in the same plight an hour later, two damaged ships in sight and no torpedoes. To forestall any illusion that the success achieved thus far was all that would be required of the U-boats COMSUBs sent the following message: "The beginning was first class. Contact must not be allowed to be lost. Report immediately. At the same time report who has observations on composition and size of convoy..." (1005/17)SC 122.Previously, Kinzel (U-338) had reported a convoy in 51°57'N - 32°45'W.

His insistence on the accuracy of the fix led COMSUBs to order the northern half of Stürmer to operate at maximum speed, on the assumption that this was a faster group detached from HX 229, it was later recognized as a second convoy.U-boat saturation point.With the battle in full swing a number of other U-boats, outbound to form Seeteufel, offered to join the slaughter but were told to continue their cruise, unless they stumbled on something too good to miss. A dispatch from Command at 1810/17 indicated that the U-boats already operating needed no assistance. Things were going very well indeed.

"Out of a convoy bound for England which was apprehended on 16 March in naval square BD 10, up to now 12 ships of 77,500 tons have been sunk and 6 other ships torpedoed."Convoy defenses.Bahr's (U-305) sighting of a convoy in 52°21'N - 30o55'W at 1428/17 altered the previous assumption of a detachment from HX 229 to that of another convoy, which indeed it was SC 122. In addition to the northern Stürmer U-boats which had been ordered to operate on Kinzel's report, a similar part of Dränger was assigned. By this time however, very long range aircraft was available to provide some measure of protection for both convoys and its contribution was evident in the decreased number of attacks.U-boat Command complains; U-boats begin to lag.The seven escort vessels attached to SC 122 doubtless had some foreknowledge of the approaching situation, though they were unable to divert the convoy in time to prevent an attack.

Consequently, the second night was by no means as fruitful as the first for the U-boats, so that COMSUBs admonished both groups:"What is happening to the shadower reports? With such a large number of submarines contact must not be broken off. Sweep further at top speed. II (0402/18 March 1943)*Freyberg (U-610) located HX 229 again and sent beacon signals for proceeding at top speed, but, before the group arrived on the scene, he was forced under by a destroyer. A straggler from the group, Schug (U-86), was criticized sharply:"Your position 120 miles behind the convoy without enemy action can be explained only as absolute faulty operation. Pursue at top speed. II " (1757/18 March 1943)The order was reiterated in the next message to Raubgraf and Stürmer:"Every sub is expected to pursue at maximum speed in order to reach convoy. Search in long sweeps depending on condition of sea. With such a large number of submarines, more submarines should get there.

We still have to give this convoy a drubbing." (1851/18 March 1943)Wind up of the operation.Until dusk on 18 March contact were few and then chiefly with escort vessels. By 1951 when Brosin (U-134) reported a slow convoy in wide formation in 53°27'N - 27°55'W the U-boats were running low on fuel and, in order to squeeze the last measure of success for this golden opportunity, COMSUBs directed them to:"continue operation long enough so that tanker (Wolfbauer (0-463) in 48°57'N 33°15'W) will be reached with 5 cbm of fuel remaining. Subs which are very low in fuel and in especially good attack position use opportunities to the full. In case of necessity rendezvous will be moved north or another sub will be appointed to transfer its fuel to others." (2115/18 March 1943)With renewed vigor the U-boats resumed the attack, but after Trojer (U-221) had sunk two ships, types Clan Mac Dougall and Salacia, he reported that the wide and close escort somehow become stronger in the interim. Again at 2240/18 Brosin sighted about 20 ships in 53°39'N - 27°35'W, speed 8, course 065°; however, the bright moonlight made it difficult for him to do more than shadow.

The excellent visibility proved an advantage to the convoys for the U-boats were unable to maintain sustained contact during the rest of the night and by noon of the following day, the surface escort once more was supplemented by aircraft, the presence of which caused COMSUBs to say:"In spite of aircraft try absolutely to get ahead, in order to be near the convoy when darkness falls. Take advantage of last chance tonight, since operation will be discontinued tomorrow at dawn." (1738/19 March 1943)The attempts of the U-boats to comply were futile: Tippelskirch (U-439) reported Asdic pursuit and depth charge for eight hours, Loeser (U-373) complained that he was constantly being forced under by aircraft, Uhlig (U-527) echoed this complaint and Witermeyer (U-190) suffered ASDIC and depth charge pursuit for nine hours. Although all U-boats were instructed to:"utilize chance for submerged day attack on morning of 20th.

Thereafter break up and sweep for single ships in large area to SW on path of convoy." (2232/19 March 1943)they had already fallen too far behind both convoys to permit further operations. As one U-boat after another reported the convoy out of reach, by tacit consent activity gradually ceased.Conclusion: "despite strong air and surface defense," the "greatest success."During the course of the three day attack on HX 229 and SC 122, the majority of the U-boats in the North Atlantic participated. Their disposition before the first sighting and the extent of the battle as regards time and area made it possible for approximately 40 U-boats to engage in the operation. They were available in sufficient numbers at the right time and place.

After one group had attacked and fallen behind, the next group was in a position to take up the battle. Furthermore, as the convoy advanced, the inadequacy of its escort forced it to abandon damaged ships, leaving them like so many sitting ducks for the U-boats which had fallen behind. The escorts were outnumbered two to one, as they had been in the case of SC 121 and HX 228. Due to the factors already mentioned plus weather, advantageous to U-boat operations, the toll of ships sunk was 21, 13 from HX 229 and eight from SC 122. In consequence, U-boats received the following commendation:"Appreciation and recognition for the, greatest success yet achieved against a convoy. After the extraordinary, successful surprise blow on the first night, tough and energetic pursuit, despite strong air and surface defense, brought splendid successes to the submarines in their attacks both night and day." (1036/21 March 1943)*Baron Walter von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen. A name I came to loathe.

There's not much that I know about "the Baron", but I sometimes wonder with that particular title if he were not a descendant from a family of nobility somewhere in Germany---not that it matters. During the bio dig I have come across various bits of information. In searching one German aristocracy website, I found listed his birth date as 1915, making him 28 years old as the Kapitan of the U-610. Apparently, a bit of aryan blue blood did flow through his veins. I also found another with the same last name, first name being Egloff, who was a Major General, born in 1883 who lived to be 99, subsequently dying in 1984. I'm not sure if this may have been his father. Apparently his portrait hangs in Kurzvita(?)*Walter von Freyberg was born in Geisenheim, Rheingau. He joined the German Navy in 1935, serving as the Assistant Damage Control Officer in the heavy cruiser Blucher when the war began. He was aboard her when she was sunk in Oslo Fjord on April 9, 1940.

Freyberg transferred to the uboats in April and after conversion training, served as the first Watch Officer in the type VIIC boat U-502 from December 19, 1940 to June 1941. U-502 at that time was commanded by the third highest uboat scoring ace of the war, OltZs Erich Topp, Knights Cross recipient with Oak Leaves and Swords (35 ships sunk, 4 damaged). Freyberg was selected for command and underwent his U-boats commander's course from June to July of 1941. He was appointed to command the Type VIIC training boat U-52 on July of 1941. On February 19, 1942 KptLt Freiher von Freyberg-Eisenberg--Allmindengen was appointed to commission U-610. He would be her only C.O.*Information from: http://www.seawaves.com/ As was mentioned earlier, von Freyberg commanded a type VIIC uboat, which was built at the Blohm & Vos shipyard, Hamburg. This type of submarine was the workhorse of the German uboat force. From 1940-1945 over 568 were commissioned.They were a slightly modified version of the successful VIIB possessing similar engines and power, but being slightly heavier, were slower than the "B".

They carried the same torpedo tube arrangement as their predecessors, which carried two bow tubes and a stern tube.For surface cruising the U-610 was powered with two supercharged Germaniawerft, 6 cylinder, 4-stroke M6V 40/46 diesels totalling between 2,800-3,200 bhp(2,400kw) at 470 to 490 rpm. Regarding submerged propulsion, several different electrical engines were used. As an aside, probably the most famous notable of this style of uboat will be remembered in the film Das Boat, (U-96).U-610 left Kiel on Sept. 12, 1942 arriving at St. Nazaire on Oct. 31, 1942 after seven weeks. On it's first maiden patrol, U-610 hit two ships in separate convoys, sinking the British ship Lifland in SC-101 and American ship Steel Navigator, a member of convoy ON-137. During it's second patrol lasting 5 weeks, it hit two more ships, sinking the Norwegian ship Bello, part of convoy ON-153 on Dec. 16, '42 and damaging the British Regent Lion, part of convoy ON-153.

Walter von Freyberg's third active patrol, which departed on March 8, 1943 from St. Nazaire would tragically impact one American family in Charlton, Massachusettes and others throughout America. Time was running out for the SS William P. Frye.Anyone who studies the logistical side of warfare, particularly the sheer weight of materiel produced by America for it's fighting men and her allies during WW2 still find it astounding. From a maritime perspective, shipbuilding yards were turning out freighters and liberty ships on a massive scale.
At the beginning of the war, it took approximately 230 man days to build a cargo ship, but as they came up to speed the total time was reduced to just 42 days. The record was the Robert E. Peary, taking just 4 days and 15 hours. The ships were being built assembly line style from prefabricated sections, which meant that three completed ships were being turned out every single day. They weren't without their problems however.

Early liberty ships suffered hull and deck cracks and a few were lost to structural defects. During WWII there were close to 1,500 significant brittle fractures and at least nineteen ships broke in half without warning. After this series of complex problems researchers found out that it was not from the welds as first suspected but due instead to the grade of steel which cause "embitterment", which was made more manifest among the ships travelling the North Atlantic where extremes in temperature caused the steel to change from ductile to brittle.
Other existing problems dealt with engineering issues such as the alignment of the shafts and propellers to alignment of the reduction gears and the main shaft. It was one of these types of mechanical failures which caused the SS William P. Frye to first straggle, then drop out of convoy HX-230.As I'd stated at the beginning, the speculation and stories that my family and I have heard, and certainly never denied by Mystic Steamship Co. were many-fold.

I had been given to understand growing up that the Wm. P. Frye dropped out due to sabotage (myth #1). However, in running down sources over the years I have found that this explanation was patently untrue. The Frye broke down due to mechanical failure. Fortunately for the ship, which had begun experiencing mechanical failure sometime on 3-28, and while hove to trying to make repairs, were under the cover of a storm that had gone from a gale to what has been described by both the convoy and the wolfpacks as "hurricane force".Yet, as monumental as the storm was, it did not prevent one U-boat from group Seewolf who was tracking the convoy, from firing a spread of torpedoes at the S.S Frye, which missed.

Group Seeteufel in the meantime had been instructed to break off its operation against a SW convoy and converge on HX-230. It should also be noted here that on March 28, not one of the U-boats had been able to maintain contact with this convoy due to the tenacity of the attack by the support group of SC-123 which had been detached the previous day.Aggressively using depth charges, the U-boats were kept off the convoy. Unfortunately, the Frye was outside the protective ring though attempting to make up lost time due to the heroic efforts of the engineers (my grandfathers group) who were able to make repairs and get the ship underway again sometime during the afternoon of March 29.While not able to maintain flank speed, the Frye was able to maintain a steady 12.5 knots as it broke into a defensive zig-zag course.

It wasn't necessarily fast, but it was enough to outdistance this trailing uboat as the afternoon light began to fade. In the end however, they were merely buying time. U-610 was already on station on the starboard side.There is something monumentally horrific about seeing a ship go down, regardless of the method or occasion.According (I'm assuming) to the log book from the U-610, a torpedo struck the S.S. William P Frye at 23:36 hours, blasting into #1 hold. Fortune held for a brief few moments as the hold, filled with wheat for the UK, cushioned and absorbed the blast. However, just four minutes later at 23:40 hours a coup de grace was fired that struck just forward of amidships. It was at this time that I believe my grandfather’s life came to an end. As the 2nd Assistant Engineer, his place was in the engine room providing watch over on their mechanical problem. He wasn't up on the deck smoking his pipe as our family had been lead to believe (myth #2).

He met his fate in the engine room and I have prayed since that as his true circumstance came to light that it was mercifully quick as the Atlantic blew in.Through research and pure serendipity I found one of the two naval armed guard survivors from the Wm. P. Frye, who went on to shatter another myth. One of his first comments to me during our phone conversation was that the "ship went down so fast that I barely had time to get my leg over the rail."

U-610's log bears this out reporting that the ship went down by the bow in approximately 5 minutes. My source also stated that there were no life boats that got lowered per the reports (myth 3), which stated that one had been lowered with crew aboard, although they were never seen again. Further debunking this, using reports from other sources, the hurricane had been so severe that many of the boats had been wrecked or washed over the side along with the exception of one. Any lifeboats remaining could not be lowered because of the fact that the boat davit ropes had been knotted and tossed up over the rail to keep them up out of the way. He said that they couldn't have untied the knots in time to lower the boats.It is hard for me to imagine what it was like during the inky blackness of a storm tossed night, knowing that your ship is pointed downward and that you have no alternative but to jump over the side in gale force winds, knowing that:

a). It is March in the North Atlantic and the water is going to hit you like ice.

b). You can't see at all save what the oil fire illuminates. You wonder as you leap if there will be some kind of flotsam to grab on to, and whether or not you'll be capable of holding on after a few icy minutes. But this Naval gunner did.....as did his buddy, gunner Blackie Bauer (Bower?). Both men, as well as the Chief Engineer, a radioman, and three Philippine stewards made their way to the sole LCT that hadn't washed overboard, but which had broken free during the explosion. Hauling themselves aboard, the 7 men would do their best to stay warm for the next six days before being spotted by HMS Shikari D85, which ironically earlier in the war had been the last warship to pick up survivors from the beaches of Dunkirk.Enter Ensign Carl S. Dalby Jr. Sadly, his heroics are unknown to history, yet I know him through a newspaper account glued in the scrapbook that my father gave me. I'd like to re-introduce him for the first time in 66 years.

From the news clipping:"Honoring the man who stayed at his radio post sending SOS calls for seven of the eight minutes his ship was afloat after it was twice torpedoed, the war shipping administration has awarded a posthumous commission of ensign to Carl S. Dalby. The story of Dalby's bravery was told to his parents who returned Sunday from New York to Boston where they went to talk to survivors of the crew of 66. The convoy with which Dalby was traveling lacked only a few hours of it's destination when it developed engine trouble. It was one of the new Liberty vessels and was making it's first crossing.

When the engine went bad the Liberty vessel had to drop back. In three or four hours the engine was repaired and the ship had just started up, full speed ahead, to try to join the convoy, when a submarine surfaced. Young Dalby radioed ahead to the convoy. Merchant Marinemen at their battle stations tried to get range on the boat but high waves made a direct hit impossible. The submarine submerged when fired on which meant Dalbey's vessel had a chance to run ahead as the speed of a submerged submarine is less than that of the new vessels. However, the submarine radioed ahead to companion ships in the water, to head that way and surround the boat. Not long after that, the first torpedo crashed into the stern of the United States vessel, but did not sink it. For minutes later there was a direct hit amidships and the vessel began to go down rapidly.Dalbey stayed at his post in the radio room sending his call over and over.

Then as the whole deck was awash he left the radio room and brought out a portable emergency radio. The barges lashed to the deck had gone overboard in the storm and the crackup (explosion?). Only one remained. Dalbey was hanging on to the side trying to fasten the radio down when a wave 30 or 40 feet high capsized the small craft. Dalbey was not seen again according to Ensign Benjamin Barrett of East Boston.Barrett and his six companions managed to find the barge and climbed aboard. For five days and six nights, they kept afloat with no water and five carrots for food."Again, the news article is at certain odds with facets of various reports, but the gist is there. The news article went on to state that they were able to start a small fire in the engine room of the barge with small wood scraps.

They were eventually rescued on the sixth morning although the sea was still running high.The Shikuri had heard Dalbey's SOS and they were out looking for survivors. The survivors in turn were dropped off in Londonderry, Ireland before being shipped back to New York. My contact (survivor) said that he got separated from his buddy Blackie Bauer and never knew what happened to him, nor did he ever receive any explanation surrounding the sinking.Back at St. Nazaire, U-610's victory dance was short lived.

October of that year would find the Coastal Command, a UK based flying squadron, very busy flying seaward to provide protective cover for incoming convoys beginning their second half of the inbound leg.A wind of change was beginning toward the latter part of 1943. Strategies were evolving which were providing huge dividends in the convoy wars. One of those was the use of the Sunderland aircraft: http://www.odyssey.dircon.co.uk/Sunderland.htm.

One of those squadrons posted within the British Coastal Command, and stationed at Castle Archdale on Lower Lough Erne, N. Ireland was DD863 of squadron 423 RCAF. On 8 October they were flying the Sunderland MarkIII which was then beginning to run low on fuel. Having reached the end of the patrol limit they had banked about and were flying in the rear of convoy SC-143. They were near the end of their fuel limit. Below them in the distance, a blip lit up on radar suddenly appeared. U-610, which had been stalking SC-143 was lying on the surface. The Sunderland had become alerted.

The Canadian crew aboard the Sunderland that day included:F/O (Flying Officer) A.H. RussellF/O A. MenaulW/C FrizzleF/O H. ForrestSgt. W. AlexanderSgt. R. LockeSgt. W. LanchasterSgt. BromheadW/O F. HarrSgt. D. DouglasSgt. A. CaterhamAccording to one of the AAR reports:"The aircraft was on patrol astern of SC-143, having joined the convoy at 17:34 hours. Two hours later they located U-610 on the surface. They over flew her and opened fire with machine guns, U-610 replied in kind. W/C Frizzle was in the pilot's seat.

He handed it over to Bert Russell who, on the run dropped 4 depth charges, one of which hung up.Two of the D.C.'s straddled the submarine which was lifted from the water, she sank leaving debris and oil on the surface. This was her 5th patrol.Russell was awarded the DFC for his attack.Harry Forrest was manning the bow machine gun positon and told me that he would always remember and could never forget the faces of the German sailors when they flew over, the white faces looking up at them. Time of patrol, 10:27-02:43 hrs.I am having trouble confirming it, but it was stated in another RCAF report that they had thrown a buoyancy device to them and that they were picked up. I'm not sure I trust the veracity of this statement, and it would require additional research to verify it.Tragedy did not always happen in combat.Two months later on 5 December the air crew was "collared" leaving the mess hall and asked to make a routine flight over to Stranraer, Scotland.

There were about 18-20 on board, probably most if not all going on leave and stealing a ride to make it down to London quickly rather than waste a half day on the trains and ferry. Tragedy struck when along the route they flew into a mountain in County Antrim overlooking the coastal town of Ball castle. One report states that 9 died in the crash.Bert Russell, DFC recipient just two months earlier was court marshaled as were one or two other crewmembers.......some doubts were cast on the airworthiness of the aircraft.ConclusionMy attempts are to highlight the victories and tragedies of the Battle of the North Atlantic and to bring light to bear on an oft overlooked, yet critical part of Victory Europe. The details speak for themselves, but my grandfather’s story and his sacrifice is part of a larger heroic story of the men who provided the means to an end. Victory in both the European and Pacific Theatre of Operation would not have happened without them.God bless them all. Our country may not recognize them for what they truly were and are, but those of us who are Gold Star families have never forgotten, nor will we ever.The Captain of the S.S. William P. Frye

From a Ridgefield, Connecticut website on Ridgefield notables:

Captain Meinhard Scherf’s life and death were full of ironies. The first of more than a dozen Ridgefielders to die in World War II, he was killed by his native country serving his adopted land and doing what he loved best: sailing the seas he was literally born on. The son of a German Merchant Marine captain, Meinhard Scherf was born on a ship. At 13 he ran away from home in Germany to sign on as a cabin boy aboard a freighter. Just before World War I, his ship docked in Portland, Ore., and he went ashore to visit a friend. When he returned, the ship was gone. The young man decided to become an American citizen and soon joined the Merchant Marine. In all, Captain Scherf had spent 37 years at sea when, on March 29, 1943, he took command of the William P. Frye on its maiden voyage. The Liberty Ship, loaded with wheat and explosives bound for Britain, was torpedoed in the North Atlantic by a German submarine, U-610. It carried 40 crew and 24 Navy guards; five crew and two guards survived. Captain Scherf went down with his ship. (Seven months later, U-610 was bombed and sunk in the North Atlantic; all aboard were lost.)
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Truth is stranger than fiction. An unlucky name:


From History.com
Germans sink American merchant ship
January 28, 1915

In the country’s first such action against American shipping interests on the high seas, the captain of a German cruiser orders the destruction of the William P. Frye, an American merchant ship.

The William P. Frye, a four-masted steel barque built in Bath, Maine, in 1901 and named for the well-known Maine senator William Pierce Frye (1830-1911), was on its way to England with a cargo of wheat. On January 27, it was intercepted by a German cruiser in the South Atlantic Ocean off the Brazilian coast and ordered to jettison its cargo as contraband. When the American ship’s crew failed to fulfill these orders completely by the next day, the German captain ordered the destruction of the ship.

As the first American merchant vessel lost to Germany’s aggression during the Great War, the William P. Frye incident sparked the indignation of many in the United States. The German government’s apology and admission of the attack as a mistake did little to assuage Americans’ anger, which increased exponentially when German forces torpedoed and sank the British-owned ocean liner Lusitania on May 7, 1915, killing more than 1,000 people, including 128 Americans. The U.S., under President Woodrow Wilson, demanded reparations and an end to German attacks on all unarmed passenger and merchant ships. Despite Germany’s initial assurances to that end, the attacks continued.

In early February 1917, when Germany announced a return to unrestricted submarine warfare, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with the country. By the end of March, Germany had sunk several more passenger ships with Americans aboard and Wilson went before Congress to ask for a declaration of war on April 2, which was made four days later. The first American ships arrived in Europe within a week, marking a decisive end to U.S. neutrality.